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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is on original proceeding to review 
a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission affirming a decision of the Appeals 
Referee that the plaintiff, Wear-Ever Aluminum, 
Inc., is liable for contributions to the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Fund on monies paid to cer-
tain distributors. The question for determination 
is whether the distributors are in the employment 
of Wear-Ever within the meaning of the Employ-
ment Security Act, Section 35-422, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
The findings of fact by the Appeals Referee 
which were adopted by the Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission present a wholly in-
adequate foundation for the determination of this 
legal issue.* There is no dispute as to the facts, 
however, since the evidence presented by the 
plaintiff at the hearing of this matter was uncon-
tradicted. For these reasons, reference is made 
throughout this Statement of Facts to the record 
of testimony at the hearing. 
Wear-Ever enters into written agreements 
( R. 95) with individuals known as distributors. 
By the agreement, the Company appoints them 
as distributors to solicit orders for the sale of 
its cutlery products from the date of the contract 
* Part of Finding No. 4 of the Findings of 
Fact is in error in that it is unsupported by evi-
dence in the record. This is detailed below at 
p. 18. 
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Statement of Facts. 
to December 31 of the same year. The contract 
is automatically renewed for successive terms of 
one year each, unless prior to December 31 of 
any year either party notifies the other to the 
contrary. 
The Company furnishes the distributor with 
a suggested price list, but he may and does sell 
at higher or lower prices (R. 24, 54, 55, 59, 60, 
78, 79) . If the suggested retail price of an item 
is $10, the Company will ship the merchandise 
for $7 ( R. 95) . If the distributor sells at the sug-
gested price, he has a profit of $3; on the other 
hand, if he sells the item for $20, he has a $13 
profit; if he sells it for $2, he has a $5 loss ( R. 
52-53) . In order to promote sales, the distributor 
gives away premiums; he alone fixes the nature 
and amount of the premiums; he buys them at 
his own expense ( R. 29-30, 55, 80, 92) . Accord-
ingly, the distributor, and not the Company, de-
termines the price at which he sells merchandise 
(R. 24). 
The Company does not reserve any direction 
or control over the activities of the distributors 
( R. 95) , and they work entirely for themselves 
( R. 39) . The distributor is not required to work 
any particular time or for a certain amount of 
time ( R. 30, 33) . He solicits as he sees fit ( R. 
78, 93) and takes a vacation when he feels like it 
( R. 37, 60). In Utah the distributor spends an 
average of about 20 to 25% of his time distribut-
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3 
Statement of Facts. 
ing Wear-Ever products, from which his average 
earnings are about $25 to $27 a month (R. 31, 57, 
58, 66) . He makes no written or oral reports ( R. 
36-37, 55) . He receives no instructions or direc-
tions of any kind ( R. 30-31, 56, 78, 91-92) . He 
does not submit his customer lists to the Company 
( R. 33, 60) . He does nothing to protect the rights 
and interest of the Company ( R. 31) . The dis-
tributors may and do sell other merchandise, in-
cluding merchandise competing with Wear-Ever 
(R. 30, 56-57, 64, 82). The distributor is notre-
quired to do any work whatever (R. 30, 56, 78, 
91-93) . He need never be present personally at 
any particular time or place, and he gets no addi-
tional bonus or financial advantage of any kind 
by appearance (R. 36-37, 55, 60, 79-80, 92). 
No distributor has any exclusive territory 
( R. 34) and a distributor may sell wherever he 
chooses (R. 34, 81, 92). No Company policy pre-
vents assignment ( R. 37) ; distributors may and 
do have assistants, without Company knowledge 
or approval ( R. 25, 55-56, 80-81) . The Company 
provides sales kits for distributors which some-
times the distributors buy; if the kits have been 
loaned, the distributors return them when they 
get through with them ( R. 53) . The distributors 
need not use order forms but may send in an 
order on any sera p of paper ( R. 36) . The dis-
tributor need not submit orders within any cer-
tain period of time (R. 68). The distributors are 
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Statement of Facts. 
not required to meet any quotas of any kind ( R. 
33, 60) . The distributor does not collect on ac-
counts ( R. 35) . The Company cannot terminate 
the contract of a distributor ( R. 35, 58) . 
If the distributor takes money from a cus-
tomer, he is not required to remit it to the Com-
pany ( R. 35-36) . In most cases the customer 
makes a down payment to the distributor; the 
arrangement is whatever is agreed to between 
the distributor and the customer (R. 44). Noth-
ing prevents the distributor from carrying his 
own paper on conditional sales agreements (R. 
77) . The distributors may and do carry stocks 
of merchandise owned by them and shipped to 
them by the Company on their orders, and on 
which they bear the risk of price fluctuation ( R. 
25, 32, 60, 79, 92) . While in the majority of sales 
the distributors direct the Company to ship mer-
chandise to their customers ( R. 85) , they make 
delivery from their own stock of merchandise 
direct to the customer whenever they desire ( R. 
25, 60, 78, 92) . 
The Company does not furnish the distributor 
with any office space, desk space, or telephone 
(R. 26, 59). He receives no salary or drawing 
account ( R. 26, 59) . Distributors may and do 
rent their own offices (R. 59). They provide their 
own business cards, stationery, advertising, and 
transportation facilities, and carry their own in-
surance (R. 26-27, 29, 59). They are not required 
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Point on Which the Plaintiff Relies. 
to keep any .records, repossess merchandise, ad-
just complaints, or investigate credit ratings (R. 
35-36, 60). Substantially all distributors engage 
in other gainful activities as they see fit ( R. 31, 
56, 64, 80, 82, 91) . Distributors are not subject 
to reprimand by the Company for anything at all 
(R. 32, 59). 
Distributors are not included in the Company 
pension plan for employees ( R. 28) . The Com-
pany does not withhold income tax on amounts 
paid distributors, nor has it ever paid or been 
held liable to pay unemployment or Social Se-
curity taxes to the federal government or any of 
the fifty states in which it operates (R. 28, 30). 
The Company has never been held liable for torts 
of or workmen's compensation on distributors 
( R. 38) . The federal government and twenty-one 
states (including nine states with statutes here 
identical with Utah) have ruled that the Company 
is not liable for unemployment compensation con-
tributions; there have been no adverse rulings 
(R. 29). 
POINT ON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF RELIES 
1. The Wear-Ever distributors do not per-
form services for the Company for wages. 
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The Wear-Ever Distributors Do Not Perform 
Services for the Company for Wages 
This case raises the question as to whether 
the distributors under contract to Wear-Ever 
Aluminum, Inc., are in the employment of Wear-
Ever within the meaning of the Employment Se-
curity Act, Section 35-4-22, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. That depends, as this Court held in Powell v. 
lndu,strial Commission} 116 Utah 385, 210 P. 2d 
1006, on "whether there was a 'service relation-
ship' between (the alleged employer) and the sev-
eral persons who entered in the oral and written 
agreements ... If there existed a 'service relation-
ship' the plaintiff was an employer ... When a 
service is performed for a person by another for 
remuneration ... a service relationship arises. 
Thus true vendor-vendee and lessor-lessee rela-
tionships are not service relationships." 
The distributors here involved sold Wear-
Ever products. There have been six cases, we be-
lieve, in which this Court held that the relation-
ship between a particular salesman and a partic-
ular manufacturer either was or was not a serv-
ice relationship.* In Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus-
*Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial 
Commission} 98 Utah 36, 91 P. 2d 512, involved a 
salesman, but there was no question but that he 
performed services; the only question was 
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Argument. 
trial Commission, 99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d 201, this 
Court found a vendor-vendee relationship. On 
the other hand, this Court found a service rela-
tionship in Creameries of America, Inc., v. Indus-
trial Commission, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300; 
Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 Utah 259, 102 P. 2d 307; Singer 
Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 
Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479; Northern Oil Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 104 Utah 353, 140 P. 2d 329; 
and Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah 423, 260 
P. 2d 744. The question at bar is whether the 
Wear-Ever distributors are like those of Fuller 
Bru.sh or like those of Creameries, Salt Lake Trib-
une, Singer, Northern, and Leach. 
At the outset it is clear that this case is not 
to be decided by any thought of the "weight of 
authority," that is, five cases against one. All 
six cases are entirely consistent with each other 
and the problem is on which side of the line the 
facts in each case fall. As this Court held in 
Singer ( 104 Utah at 183), "in every case under 
the Act that has been before this Court, we have 
steadfastly laid down the same rules and tests." 
Accordingly, let us look at the facts of each of the 
whether he was to be excluded under Section 
19 ( j) ( 5) of the Act. Abrahamsen v. Board of 
Review, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P. 2d 213, involved 
salesmen; however, there was no issue as to the 
service relationship, but only as to constitutional 
law. 
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Argument. 
six cases and compare them with those of the case 
at bar. This may be done most conveniently, we 
believe, by the use of parallel columns. 
In Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial 
Commission, 98 Utah 571, the facts as compared 
with the present facts were these: 
Creameries 
''. . . the retail sale price 
was fixed by plaintiff 
[ the manufacturer ] 
(p. 584). This remun-
eration was the differ-
ence between what 
Foss had to pay the 
company for the prod-
ucts and what he was 
permitted to charge 
for such products." 
"The dealer agreed not 
t o h a n d 1 e products 
other than those of the 
company," (p. 574). 
The company granted 
to the dealer "the ex-
clusive right to sell its 
products at retail in a 
defined franchise area'' 
( p. 57 4). 
The agreement pro-
vided "for the 'pur-
chase' from the dealer, 
upon the termination 
of the contract, of any 
Wear-Ever 
The distributor deter-
mines the price at 
which he sells mer-
chandise ( R. 24) . He 
is furnished a sug-
gested price list, but 
may and does sell at 
higher or lower prices 
( R. 24, 54-55, 59-60, 
78-79). 
Distributors may and 
do sell other merchan-
dise, including mer-
e hand is e compet-
ing with Wear-Ever 
( R. 30, 56-57). 
No distributor has any 
exclusive territory (R. 
34). 
There is no such provi-
sion in the written 
agreement ( R. 95) and 
there are no side agree-
ments ( R. 24). Dis-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




customers or business tributors are not re-
acquired by the latter quired to submit their 
... " ( p. 57 4) . customer lists to the 
''The agreement was 
terminable by either 
party upon giving the 
other two weeks' writ-
ten notice." ( p. 57 4) . 
''The agreement was not 
assignable without the 
written consent of the 
company." (p. 574). 
company ( R. 33, 60). 
The company cannot 
terminate the contract 
of a distributor ( R. 35, 
58). 
No company policy 
prevents assignment 
( R. 37) . Distributors 
may and do have as-
sistants, without com-
pany knowledge or ap-
proval ( R. 25, 55-56, 
80-81). 
On the Creameries facts, of course, there was a 
service relationship. There the distributor could 
handle no other products, and had an exclusive 
territory in which he could "resell" only at prices 
fixed by the manufacturer. At the termination of 
the contract he had to turn over his customers to 
the company and go out of business. His remuner-
ation was in an amount fixed by the company, and 
for services he had to perform personally. 
Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Industrial 
Commission} 99 Utah 259, is quite similar to 
Creameries and quite different from Wear-Ever: 
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Argument. 
S.alt Lake Tribune 
The carrier "was, how-
ever, required to sell 
the newspapers at a 
certain fixed price." ( p. 
260). 
The carrier agreed ''to 
deliver said news-
pa per s and publica-
tions regularly a n d 
promptly" ( p. 261) . 
The contract could be 
terminated by the com-
pany "with or without 
cause, upon 15 days' 
notice in writing." 
(p. 261) 
"Upon termination of 
the contract the circu-
lator was required to 
turn over to the com-
pany ... the names and 
addresses of all sub-
scribers" ( p. 261) . 
Wear-Ever 
The distributor deter-
mines the price at 
which he sells mer-
chandise ( R. 24) . He is 
furnished a suggested 
price list, but may and 
does sell at higher and 
lower prices ( R. 24, 54-
55, 59-60, 78-79) . 
The distributor is not 
required to do any 
work whatever, or to 
follow any directions 
or instructions of any 
kind (R. 30, 56, 78, 91-
93). 
The company cannot 
terminate the contract 
of a distributor ( R. 35, 
58). 
Distributors are notre-
quired to submit their 
customer lists to the 
company ( R. 33, 60) . 
Again, the service relationship was evident. The 
carrier had to perform the service of delivering 
newspapers regularly and promptly, and he had 
to charge the subscriber exactly the price fixed 
by the company. When an alleged purchaser is 
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Argument. 
so restricted in his manner of reselling and the 
price at which he resells, of course he has not 
genuinely made a purchase and resale. 
Next we consider Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 99 Utah 97, which case, we 
submit, is indistinguishable from the case at bar 
in all material facts: 
Fuller Brush 
"The company suggest-
ed retail prices for the 
various articles but the 
d e a 1 e r was not re-
quired to adhere there-
to." ( p. 104) 
"The dealer set his own 
hours of work, the or-
der of work, and meth-
ods of work." ( pp. 104-
105) 
"He made no work re-
ports to the company 
and received no orders 




mines the p r i c e at 
which he sells mer-
chandise ( R. 24) . He 
is furnished a suggest-
ed price list but may 
and does sell at higher 
and lower prices ( R. 
24, 54-55, 59-60, 78-79) 
The distributor is not 
required to work any 
particular time or any 
certain amount of time 
( R. 30, 33). He solicits 
as he sees fit ( R. 78, 
93) and takes a vaca-
tion when he feels like 
it ( R. 37, 60) . 
The distributor makes 
no written or oral re-
ports ( R. 36-37, 55) . 
He receives no instruc-
tions or directions ( R. 
30-31, 56, 78, 91-92) . 
"He made no reports of The distributor makes 
s a 1 e s , furnished the no reports ( R. 36-37, 
company no list of his 55), and does not sub-
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customers or record of 
his accounts with 
them. Any good will 
he built up was his 
own and not the com-
pany's.'' ( p. 105) 
The dealers "were sup-
plied with a sample 
case of brushes, which 
was charged or leased 
to them, and which 
they c o u 1 d pay for 
and keep or return for 
credit upon termina-
tion of the contract 
... " ( p. 104) 
The dealer "could sell 
for cash or credit with-
out knowledge of the 
company," (p. 105). 
The dealers "have a 
territory assigned to 
them and in which they 
effectuate their sales" 
( p. 104). 
Wear-Ever 
mit customer lists to 
the company ( R. 33, 
60). The distributor 
does nothing to protect 
the rights and inter-
ests of the company 
(R. 31). 
The company provides 
sales kits for distribu-
tors which sometimes 
the distributors buy. 
If the kits have been 
loaned, the distri bu-
tors return them when 
they get through. ( R. 
43) 
If the suggested retail 
price of an item is $10, 
the company will ship 
the merchandise for 
$7. If the distributor 
sells at the suggested 
price, he has a profit of 
$3. On the other hand, 
if the distributor sells 
the item for $20, he has 
a $13 profit; if he sells 
it for $2, he has a $5 
loss ( R. 52-53 ) . 
The distributors sell 
wherever they choose 
( R. 34, 81, 92) , so they 
are subject to even less 
restrictions than the 
Fuller Brush dealers 
( R. 89). 
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In every respect, therefore, the case at bar 
is as good or better on the facts than the case for 
Fuller Brush. The holding of this Court, in Fuller 
Brush, in which the basic element of the vendor-
vendee relationship is emphasized, is squarely in 
point ( p. 106) : 
"Since there was no obligation on plaintiff to 
pay claimant any remuneration for services, 
but claimant must get his remuneration, if 
any, from his ability to sell the brushes at 
an advanced price over the cost to him and 
that he and not plaintiff assumed the .risk 
of profit or loss on the venture or under-
taking, it follows claimant's services were not 
rendered for wages or under a contract of 
hire." 
The essential element, the risk of profit or loss 
on the venture, is present in the case at bar 
from the undisputed testimony that the company 
charges the distributor $7 for a particular item 
and he may sell it for $2, $10, or $20 ( R. 52, 53) . 
In addition, the distributor, in order to promote 
sales, usually gives away premiums; he alone 
fixes the nature and amount of the premiums; he 
buys them at his own expense; and of course the 
amount of the premiums affects his profit or loss 
( R. 29-30, 55, 80, 92) . 
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.lndustrial Com-
mission, 104 Utah 175, restated the principle of all 
these cases and expanded the language of the 
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Argument. 
Fuller Brush opinion.* Then this Court showed 
that, unlike Fuller J the Singer salesman per-
formed personal services for the Company, "in-
consistent with the concept of a vendor-vendee 
relationship" ( 104 Utah at p. 194) . These serv-
ices, quite different from the facts of Wear-Ever, 
were these: 
Singer 
" . . . the salesman is 
authorized to solicit, 
negotiate and effect at 
prices and on terms 
approved and author-
ized from time to time 
by the Company" ( p. 
193). 
". . . it authorized him 
to collect on such Com-
pany accounts as it 
left or placed in his 
hands" ( p. 193) . 
Wear-Ever 
The distributor deter-
mines the price at 
which he sells mer-
chandise (R. 24). He 
is furnished a sug-
gested price list, but 
may and does sell at 
higher and 1 o w e r 
prices ( R. 24, 54-55, 
59-60, 78-79) . 
The distributor does 
not collect on accounts 
( R. 35). 
". . . salesman make The distributor makes 
weekly reports of all no written or oral re-
business done, and re- ports ( R. 36-37, 55) . 
*This Court noted that some other states 
have construed their statutes differently. Even 
so, it is worth noting that the Company has not 
been held liable in any of the fifty states (R. 28-
29) . This includes Oregon ( R. 29) , whose decision 
in a Singer Sewing Machine case this Court ex-
pressly approved ( 104 Utah at p. 193). 
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mit daily all moneys 
collected'' ( p. 193). 
"The salesman must 'do 
any act or thing the 
Company considers 
necessary or advisable 
for the protection of 
its interest or ~protec­
tion of its rights) JJ 
(Italics by the Court) 
( p. 194). 
"The commissions . . . 
were not deductible by 
the salesman, but all 
moneys were sent in to 
t h e Company" ( p. 
194). 
". . . in any dispute the 
books of the Company 
shall be binding on the 
salesman" ( p. 194) . 
Wear-Ever 
If the distributor takes 
money f r o m a cus-
tomer, he is not re-
quired to remit it to 
the Company ( R. 35-
36). 
The distributor has no 
s u c h obligation ( R. 
31 ) . Indeed, he is not 
required to do any 
work whatever or fol-
low any directions or 
instructions o f a n y 
kind ( R. 30, 56, 78, 91-
93). 
The down payment is 
whatever is agreed to 
between the distribu-
tor and the customer 
( R. 44) ; the distribu-
tor is not required to 
remit money collected 
to the Company ( R. 
35-36). 
There is no such provi-
sion in the w r i t t e n 
agreement ( R. 95) and 
there are no side agree-
ments(R.24). 
" . . . his contract was The Company cannot 
terminable at the will terminate the contract 
of either party." ( p. of a distributor ( R. 
178 ) . 35' 58 ) . 
Certainly, when the Singer salesman had to do 
anything the Company directed, there was a serv-
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ice relationship. But your Honors made it clear 
that the twofold test was whether the salesman 
did "render personal services for another~ and 
whether he was "entitled to remuneration 
(wages) therefor." To render personal service 
for himself, and to be compensated by ''his ability 
to sell at an advanced price," does not make a 
salesman an employee. 
Northern Oil Oo. v. Industrial Commission, 
104 Utah 353, so clearly involved a service rela-
tionship that it is hard to see why the Company 
litigated. The facts are entirely different from 
those of Wear-Ever: 
Northern 
''We are not dealing 
here with a definite 
form a 1 contract be-
tween t h e company 
and the solicitors, as 
none existed . . . " ( p. 
360). 
" ... the company was 
selling its stock at ten 
cents per share" ( p. 
361). 
" . . . the services of 
the solicitors could be 
terminated without in-
curring liabilityn ( Ital-
ics by the Court) ( p. 
360). 
Wear-Ever 
The written agreement 
between the Company 
and its distributors is 
in evidence ( R. 95) . 
There is no agreement 
except in accordance 
with the printed form 
(R. 24). 
The distributor deter-
mines the price at 
which he sells mer-
chandise ( R. 24, 54-55, 
59-60' 78-79) . 
The Company cannot 
terminate the contract 
of distributor ( R. 35, 
58). 
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The solicitor was al-
lowed "a greater com-
mission when the solic-
itor w a s personally 
present at the consum-
mation of a sale than 
was allowed other-
wise" ( p. 359) . 
Wear-Ever 
The distributor need 
never be present per-
sonally at any particu-
lar time or place, and 
he gets no additional 
bonus or financial ad-
vantage of any kind by 
appearance (R. 36-37, 
55, 60, 79-80, 92). 
As your Honors pointed out, the requirement of 
personal presence in the Northern case is con-
sistent only with a service relationship. 
Last in our review of the cases involving 
salesmen is Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah 
423. The differences between Leach on one hand, 
and Fuller Brush and the case at bar on the other, 
are readily apparent: 
Leach 
The Company g i v e s 
the dealer "the exclu-
sive right . . . to so-
licit orders . . . in a 
certain terri tory . . . '' 
( p. 425). 
'' ... at prices fixed by 
the plaintiffs [the 
Company]" ( p. 425) . 
"The p 1 a i n t i f f s [the 
Company] furnish all 
order forms and deal-
ers are required to 
submit all orders ... 
Wear-Ever 
No distributor has any 
exclusive territory ( R. 
34) . The distributors 
sell wherever they 
choose ( R. 34, 81, 92) . 
The distributor deter-
mines the p r i c e at 
which he sells mer-
chandise ( R. 24, 54-55, 
59-60' 78-79 ) . 
The distributor need 
not use order forms 
but may send in an or-
der on any scrap of 
paper ( R. 36) . The 
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within five days" ( p. 
425) 0 
"The dealers did not 
have legal title to the 
products for w h i c h 
they obtained orders. 
Title reposed in the 
plaintiffs'' ( p. 428). 
Wear-Ever 
distributor n e e d not 
submit orders with-
in any certain period 
of time (R. 33). 
The distributors may 
and do carry stocks of 
merchandise owned by 
them and shipped to 
them by the Company 
on their orders, and on 
which they bear the 
risk of price fl uctua-
tion ( R. 25, 32, 60, 79, 
92). 
At this point it is worth noting that as to the 
amount of stock maintained by a distributor, the 
Industrial Commission fell into an error of fact. 
The Appeals Referee stated ( R. 8) : 
"The distributors did not ordinarily carry a 
sizable stock of such paid-for products and 
then deliver directly to the customers." 
For this statement there is absolutely no support 
in the record. The only witnesses who said any-
thing about a stock of merchandise were Smith, 
Howells, and Jackson. Smith testified that "a 
large proportion of our active distributors carry 
stocks of merchandise" ( R. 32) . Howells, asked 
if he maintained a stock of merchandise, replied 
"Yes" ( R. 55) . Jackson, asked if he had a stock 
of merchandise, answered ''I do" ( R. 34) , and 
agreed simply that "the majority" of his mer-
chandise sold is delivered by the Company ( R. 
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85). None of these statements justifies a conclu-
sion that the stock of merchandise was not "siz-
able". The record establishes that the distributors 
delivered merchandise from their own stock when-
ever they wanted to do so, in which case, of course, 
they had the legal title. 
Now in the other cases, solely at their own 
option, the distributors had the company make 
direct shipments. With respect to these, the In-
dustrial Commission assumed, contrary to the 
law, that the distributor could not have had title, 
and hence be in a vendor-vendee relationship, sim-
ply because he did not personally physically han-
dle the merchandise. This assumption is shown 
by the statement of the Appeals Referee ( R. 8) : 
"The only time when a distributor had 
title to the product was when he paid the 
company established price, minus his dis-
count and commission,* and took delivery 
himself.'' 
But is it the law that a distributor cannot have 
title because he does not physically handle the 
merchandise? 
In Middleton v. Evans, 86 Utah 396, 45 P. 2d 
570, the plaintiff Middleton had obtained a judg-
ment against the defendant Evans. Evans had 
written a book entitled "Joseph Smith, an Amer-
ican Prophet", which was published by the inter-
*There is no commission; the distributor 
simply buys merchandise at a discount ( R. 95) . 
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pleaded defendant, MacMillan Company. The 
agreement between MacMillan and Evans pro-
vided that Evans would purchase 1,000 copies 
of his work at the retail price less a 40% discount. 
After the book had been published Evans solicited 
the Deseret Book Company to buy copies of the 
book, and received an order for 300 copies which 
he forwarded to MacMillan. Then MacMillan 
''shipped said books as ordered directly to the 
Deseret Book Company, according to Evans' di-
rections" ( pp. 398-399) . Before Deseret paid any-
body for the 300 books MacMillan served a writ of 
garnishment on it. The question then was whether 
Deseret owed Evans, in which case the garnish-
ment was good, or owed MacMillan, in which case 
it was not. 
The argument of MacMillan was that Evans 
had never received the books because there had 
been no personal delivery to him. This Court re-
jected that argument, holding ( p. 403) : 
"If there is any question about the deliv-
ery in ths case to the carrier being sufficient 
to constitute an unconditional appropriation 
to this contract, it will be settled by the fact 
that it is a well-established rule that delivery 
to a person appointed by the buyer to receive 
the goods or to any third person at the buy-
er's request or with his consent is sufficient 
delivery to the buyer. See 55 C. J.p. 364, ~ 357, 
note 75; also, Francis v. M erkleyJ 59 Cal. App. 
196, 210 P. 437; Fergus County Hardware Co. 
v. Crowley) 57 Mont. 340, 188 P. 374; Wil-
liamsburgh Stopper Co. v. BickartJ 104 Conn. 
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674, 134 A. 233. In the last case it is held 
that delivery to the buyer's customers in 
accordance with his instructions is delivery 
to him.'' 
Then this Court considered the question of title 
and held squarely that title had passed from Mac-
Millan to Evans and from Evans to Deseret ( pp. 
405-406) : 
"But counsel argues that the Deseret 
Book Company is liable or indebted for these 
books to whoever was the owner of them im-
mediately prior to the delivery to the Deseret 
Book Company. That is true, but if the above 
analysis is correct, then when MacMillan 
Company delivered the books to the carrier 
the title passed to Evans and he became the 
owner of them, and wh.en he delivered the 
books to the Deseret Book Company the title 
passed from him to the Deseret Book Com-
pany; so that immediately prior to the deliv-
ery to the Deseret Book Company the title 
was in Evans. It might be that the delivery 
of the books to the carrier by MacMillan Com-
pany would be sufficient to pass the property 
in the books from MacMillan Company to 
Evans and at the same time from Evans to the 
Deseret Book Company, even before they 
were actually delivered physically to it; but, 
in any event, if we are correct in holding that 
there was a sale to Evans and a resale by him 
to the Deseret Book Company, then even 
though one act transferred title it would pass 
first from MacMillan Company to Evans and 
through him to the Book Company. And the 
Deseret Book Company was indebted to 
Evans for the purchase price of the books at 
the time of the service of this garnishment 
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upon it, and the plaintiff was entitled to a 
judgment to that effect." 
Accordingly, this case establishes, contrary to 
the Appeals Referee, that title to merchandise 
passes through the distributor who orders it from 
the manufacturer and sells it, at such prices as 
he sees fit, to his customer. In effect, the distribu-
tor has what the stock market would term a "call" 
on the company. So, he is assigning to his own 
customers for $2, $10, or $20 the merchandise he 
is buying from the company for $7. Certainly the 
distributor performs no greater "service" for the 
company when he orders the company to mail di-
rect than when he takes the article out of his 
suitcase. In either event the distributor is buying 
and sellin~g and, as this Court said in Fuller Brush, 
he must get his remuneration, if any, from his 
ability to sell at an advanced price over the cost 
to him. 
Continuing with the differences between the 
Leach dealers and the Wear-Ever distributors: 
Leach Wear-Ever 
The dealers "use the The Company does not 
plaintiffs' office tele- furnish the distributor 
phone as a reference with any office space, 
in their selling activi- desk space, or tele-
ties and the plain tiffs phone ( R. 25, 59) . 
provide a table at its 
office for the use of the 
dealers" ( p. 425) . 
"Because the plaintiffs The distributors are 
have sales and instal- not required to meet 
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lation quotas to meet, 
the services of dealers 
who do not produce 
sufficiently are termi-
nated by the plaintiffs. 
Only five days' notice 
of termination need be 
given to the dealers by 
the plaintiffs." ( pp. 
425-426). 
Wear-Ever 
any q u o t a s of any 
kind ( R. 33, 60) . The 
Company cannot ter-
minate the contract of 
a distributor ( R. 35, 
58). 
And your Honors held that it was ''manifest" that 
the dealers were agents because they received a 
"commission to be fixed by and in accordance with 
a discount or commission schedule maintained by 
the [Company] at its office" (p. 429). But in the 
case at bar, as in Fuller, the earnings of the dis-
tributor equal the price he charges the customer, 
less the cost of the merchandise, the premiums he 
elects to give, the profits he can realize from the 
trade-ins he elects to take, and the expense for 
transportation, telephone, and the like that he 
thinks it good business to incur. 
So much for the cases involving salesmen. 
However, there should also be noted one addi-
tional case which, while it involved an alleged 
lessor-lessee relationship, is the most recent case 
before your Honors where the service relationship 
was in dispute. Accordingly, we note the facts of 
Balt Lake Transportation Co. v. Board of Review, 
5 Utah 2d 87, 296 P. 2d 983: 
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The "plaintiff is the 
owner of non-transfer-
able franchises from 
the Utah Public Serv-
ice Commission a n d 
from Salt Lake City to 
operate taxicabs . 0 0 " 
(Italics ours) ( p. 89) . 
"Further, the drivers 
were required to keep 
daily trip sheets, at-
tend safety meetings 
• 0 • The drivers were 
not allowed to choose 
any shift they might 
want . . . " ( p. 89) 
"Plaintiff furnished 
taxicab stands, ~garage 
service, supplied a 11 
the n e c e s s a r y oil, 
grease and antifreeze 
liquids and defrayed 
all costs of repairs to 
the cabs. It also fur-
nished dispatchers, 
switchboard and two-
way radio service and 
carried liability insur-
ance . . . " ( p. 89 ) . 
Wear-Ever 
Nothing r e q u i r e s 
Wear-Ever to sell di-
rect to the distribu-
tor's customers. Wear-
Ever i s n o t legally 
bound to perform all 
selling activities itself. 
The distributor makes 
no reports ( R. 36-37, 
55) . He never need be 
present personally at 
any particular time or 
place ( R. 36-37, 55, 60, 
79-80, 92) , and he is 
not required to work 
a n y particular time 
(R. 30, 33). 
The company does not 
furnish the distribu-
tors with any office 
space, desk space, or 
telephone ( R. 26, 59) . 
Distributors provide 
t h e i r own business 
cards, stationery, ad-
vertising, and trans-
port at ion facilities, 
and carry their own 
insurance (R. 26-27, 
29, 59). 
''. • 0 plaintiff actually The company does not 
had the right to con- reserve any direction 
trol the manner and or control over the ac-
method of the drivers' tivities of the distrib-
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ing the services.'' ( p. 
91). 
''If a driver were acting 
in a manner inimical to 
the interests of plain-
tiff, such as b e i n g 
drunk while on a shift, 
plaintiff could order 
him to report to the 
garage and they would 
take the car away from 
him, or if the driver 
were in no condition to 
safely drive, w o u 1 d 
send someone to bring 
the cab in . . . " ( p. 
91). 
" "f d . 
. • • 1 a river re-
fused a shift assigned 
to him, plaintiff could 
refuse to lease to him 
any more." ( p. 91). 
Wear-Ever 
utors (R. 95). 
The distributor is not 
required to follow any 
directions or instruc-
tions of any kind ( R. 
30, 56, 78, 91-93) . He 
is not subject to repri-
mand by the company 
for anything at all; if 
he is a "bad actor", the 
company can do noth-
ing about it ( R. 32, 
59). 
The company cannot 
terminate the contract 
of a distributor ( R. 35, 
58). 
Certainly, therefore, Salt Lake Trans~portation is 
not adverse. Indeed, the function of operating 
taxicabs could not legally be assigned to the driv-
ers, and so they did for the company the work it 
was required to do. Further, a service relation-
ship could not be denied when the company had 
the right to control the manner and method of the 
drivers' activities. The very facts on which the 
Salt Lake Transportation decision depended es-
tablish how different the present case is. 
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Faced, then, with the similarity of this case 
to the Fuller Brush case and the entire dissimi-
larity of this case to the others where a service 
relationship was found, what is the answer of the 
Department of Employment Security? That is 
found in the "Comment'' of the Appeals Referee 
(R. 10): 
". . . it must first be determined whether the 
so-called distributors were actually perform-
ing a personal service for this employer or 
whether they were independent operators 
who merely purchased a product from this 
company and then resold it independent of 
the company. 
To assist in making such a determina-
tion, the objectives of the company must be 
examined. It then becomes obvious, natu-
rally, that the objective of the company was 
to sell its products. And to further such ob-
jective, the company sales manager for Utah 
solicited the services of various individuals 
and had them sign the 'distributor agree-
ments.' It is noted that in addition to other 
sales provisions, these agreements recite that 
such individuals were 'independent contrac-
tors' and not employees. However, such lan-
guage has no bearing on the actual and fac-
tual relationship and the facts fall far short 
of showing that the so-called distributors 
were really independent in the sense of hav-
ing their own business establishments. 
The degree of control over the distribu-
tors appears to have been rather limited, but 
it still must be considered that they were per-
forming a personal service for the employer. 
Furthermore, in this respect, it must be noted 
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that the company sales manager did not con-
tact these individuals (prospective distribu-
tors) for the purpose of selling the company 
product to them. They were solicited for the 
purpose of utilizing their services in selling 
the company product to the public." (Italics 
ours). 
In analyzing this ''Comment" of the Appeals Ref-
eree, it will be observed that he says that it must 
first be determined whether the distributor was 
performing a personal service for the Company-
which is true. Then he says that to assist in mak-
ing the determination, the objective of the Com-
pany must be examined and that the objective of 
the Company was to sell its products - all of 
which is equally true of Fuller Brush and proves 
nothing as to the service relationship. Then he 
says that the Company "solicited the services of 
various individuals"-which of course begs the 
entire question as to whether they performed 
services! 
Following this statement, the Appeals Ref-
eree mentions the language of the agreement ( R. 
95), which recites that the distributors are inde-
pendent contractors in their own business, and he 
says that this is not conclusive-which is true. 
And then he concludes by saying that "it still 
must be considered they were performing a per-
sonal service." So, except for the unsupported 
question-begging statement that the Company 
"solicited services," the whole argument of the 
Appeals Referee is simply that the distributors 
were performing services for the Company be-
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cause the objective of the Company was to sell its 
products! 
The mere fact that the Company receives 
benefit from the services performed by distribu-
tors is not determinative of the question whether 
such distributors perform service within the 
meaning of the Utah law. The test consistently 
applied by the Utah court is whether such serv-
ices are performed for another or for the sales-
man himself. If the facts show that the service 
is rendered for himself and not for an employer, 
there is no service relationship, notwithstanding 
incidental benefit to the alleged employer. Thus 
this court stated in the Fuller Brush case (99 
Utah at pp. 105, 103) : 
''That claimant performed ·personal service is 
not in dispute) but there is a dispute as to 
whether such services were performed for 
plaintiff or for self and as to whether he re-
ceived wages therefor or profits on sales. 
* * * * * * * 
But it is not all personal service per-
formed for another that comes within the 
act, but only such as is performed 'for wages 
or under any contract of hire.' 'Wages) is de-
fined as all compensation payable for per-
sonal services J rendered for another under a 
contract o.f hire) express or implied. This 
compensation is based upon and computed 
upon service rendered) and is not derived 
from the accomplishment of a purpose or 
achievement of an objective, by the person 
receivin~g the remuneration, through a dif-
ference in two prices. The essential elements 
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of wages are that they form a direct obliga-
tion against the employer, in favor of the em-
ployee; that when the service is performed 
the compensation, if any, accrues and be-
comes payable regardless of the success or 
failure of the undertaking; that any profits 
or earning over and above costs of the service 
accrues to the employer, and any loss as a 
result of the undertaking or service must be 
borne by the employer." (Italics ours.) 
This concept of service h.as been reiterated by this 
Court on several occasions, most recently in the 
case of Leach v. Board of Review, where this Court 
commented upon the Fuller Brush case and noted 
that: 
'' . . . in selling those brushes they ( the Fuller 
Brush salesmen) were rendering service for 
themselves and not for the plaintiff com-
pany." 123 Utah at p. 429). 
In the case at bar, as a matter of fact one of the 
Wear-Ever distributors had previously worked as 
a Fuller Brush salesman and testified that he was 
under less obligation to Wear-Ever in the per-
formance of service than he had been to Fuller 
( R. 82, 83) . If the Fuller situation constituted 
activity nonservice in character, a fortiori as to 
the Wear-Ever situation. 
In summary, then, what are the important 
benchmarks to determine whether a salesman is 
engaged in performing "services" for the manu-
facturer of the products he sells, or whether the 
relationship is nonservice in character: 
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( 1) Most important, we think, is whether 
the salesman himself fixes the price at which he 
sells the merchandise. The manufacturer fixed 
the price in every case where a service relation-
ship was found: Creameries} Salt Lake Tribune, 
Singer, Northern, and Leach. And the significance 
of this fact is emphasized by your Honor's state-
ment in Powell v. Industrial Commission, 116 
Utah 385, 210 P. 2d 1006, where a lessor-lessee 
relationship was alleged, that 
" . . . the miners did not sell the coal they 
produced 'because regardless of the fluctua-
tion in the price of coal, the miners received 
the same price for the coal they produced-
one dollar and fifty cents per ton.'" 
But in Fuller Brush and Wear-Ever the earnings 
of the salesman depend on his ability to sell "at an 
advanced price over the cost to him"; the price is 
fixed by the salesman. When the salesman fixes 
prices, he is selling his own goods, either in his 
possession or on which he has a call from the 
manufacturer; when the salesman sells at the 
manufacturer's price, he is selling the manufac-
turer's goods. 
( 2) If the contract is terminable by the 
Company, particularly on· short notice, this is 
strong evidence of a service relationship. This 
was likewise the situation in every case where a 
service relationship was found: Creameries, Salt 
Lake Tribune, Singer, Northern, and Leach. But 
not in Fuller Brush or Wear-Ever. 
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( 3) Restrictions on the activities of the 
salesman show that the relationship is of service 
rather than that of vendor-vendee. Such restric-
tions may be that the salesman shall handle no 
other products (Creameries, Leach) ; that he shall 
make reports (Singer) ; that he shall meet a sales 
quota (Leach) ; that he shall work personally, 
regularly, promptly, or as directed (Creameries, 
Salt Lake Tribune, Singer, Northern); that he 
shall surrender his customers' lists (Creameries, 
Balt Lake Tribune) . Another restriction, that 
he shall work only in a particular area, was noted 
in Creameries and Leach, but this was not fatal 
to the vendor-vendee relationship in Fuller Brush. 
The important thing is that at least one of these 
restrictions was present in every case where a 
service relationship was found, but Wear-Ever 
salesmen are subject to none of them. 
Accordingly, we sincerely urge that this 
Court hold that on the undisputed facts Wear-
Ever distributors did not perform services for the 
Company for wages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID B. BUERGER 
BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL, RODEWALD, 
KYLE & BUERGER 
J. THOMAS GREENE 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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